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We assess whether or not the trade liberalisation process in Brazil had any effect on both the 
reduction in the wage differential between registered and non-registered (roughly formal and 
informal) workers and the fall in the proportion of registered workers. We discuss the channels 
through which trade liberalisation could affect these two variables and put forward three 
empirical approaches to test the existence of any correlation between them. Our results 
suggest that the fall in the wage gap between registered and non-registered workers in the 
manufacturing sector was affected by trade-related variables, particularly, by the import 
penetration ratio. However, we do not find robust evidence that trade liberalisation had a 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
A common feature of several middle-income developing countries in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s was the undertaking of several structural reforms, particularly trade liberalisation 
measures. Many recent studies have tried to assess the impact of these reforms on the labour 
market of these countries. Basically, researchers have looked for evidences of any of the 
Hecksher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson (HOS) framework’s implications in developing country 
labour markets. More specifically, they have looked for evidence that trade liberalisation has 
triggered the following sequence of events: 1) increases in the relative price of unskilled 
intensive products/firms/industries; 2) a positive effect of these price increases on the demand 
for unskilled workers; 3) a reduction in the wage premium of skilled workers, leading to lower 
wage inequality in these countries,
1 and finally 4) an increase in the share of skilled workers in all 
sectors due to the increase in the relative price of unskilled workers. Besides this interest on the 
distributional consequences of trade liberalisation based on the HOS framework, researchers 
have also tried to measure the impact of trade liberalisation on employment and on the wage 
structure as a way to assess the importance of rent-sharing in the protected sectors.
2  
Despite these numerous studies on the impact of trade liberalisation on developing 
country labour markets, several questions remain to be explored. In particular, as pointed out 
by Behrman (1999), the impact of trade liberalisation on the “informal” manufacturing sector 
and the existence of possible spillover effects on the rest of the economy have been 
overlooked.
3 This is important because if dual labour markets are important in developing 
countries, then to overlook the implications of trade liberalisation for the wage differential 
between “formal” and “informal” workers and on their mobility pattern
4 may yield an 
incomplete description of its impact on the entire labour market.  
The aim of this paper is to start filling this gap on the empirical literature using the 
Brazilian trade liberalisation experience as a quasi-natural experiment.
5 We assess whether 
trade liberalisation can be considered a serious candidate to explain both the fall in the wage 
differential between registered (formal) and non-registered (informal) workers, and the fall in 
the proportion of registered workers in the economy. The episode of trade liberalisation in 
Brazil is particularly interesting for this task because it implied a huge fall in tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and it occurred during a short period of time, basically within 3 years. Besides, the 
schedule of tariff reduction announced in 1990 was brought forward several times, making a 
strong case for the exogeneity of the trade reforms.
6  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we will describe the evolution of the 
proportion of registered workers and of the wage gap between registered and non-registered 
workers in the manufacturing sector during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Second, we will discuss the 
literature on the impact of the trade liberalisation on the labour market of developing 
countries, and the channels through which trade liberalisation could affect both the wage 
differential between registered and non-registered workers and the proportion of registered 
workers. Third, we will describe the main features of the trade liberalisation reform in Brazil. 
Fourth, we will put forward different procedures to identify whether or not trade liberalisation 
had any impact on the fall in the wage differential between registered and non-registered 
workers and on the increase of the proportion of non-registered workers. These procedures 
are based on: 1) exploiting industry variation of trade-related measures such as effective tariffs,   Fábio Veras Soares  3 
 
import penetration and export orientation ratios for a panel of 17 tradable manufacturing 
industries; 2) exploiting regional variation of industry dispersion within the country, so that we 
will be able to test the impact, if any, of trade liberalisation on the entire labour market and not 
only in the manufacturing sector (spillover effect); 3) adding the non-tradable sector and 
cohort variation to the analysis. This latter approach allows us to use additional variation in 
industry-cohort cells in order to assess the impact of trade liberalisation on the tradable sector 
when compared to the non-tradable sector.  
Our results suggest that trade liberalisation had a statistically significant impact on the 
reduction of the wage differential between registered and non-registered workers in the 
manufacturing sector. However, we do not find evidence of spillover to entire economy.  
As for the impact on the proportion of registered workers, the results are not very robust, and 
in our opinion, it is not possible to make a strong case for the link between trade liberalisation 
and this phenomenon.  
2  REGISTERED AND NON-REGISTERED WORKERS  
IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN BRAZIL 
The proportion of non-registered workers increased –at least, for non-farming activities – and 
the wage differential between the two groups diminished during the 1990’s. The proportion of 
non-registered workers increased from 30% in 1981 to 40% in 1999, and the bulk of this 
increase was concentrated after 1990, just after the country started the market-oriented 
reforms, such as the programmes of privatization and the process of trade liberalisation.  
While the proportion of non-registered workers increased, the raw wage gap between 
registered and non-registered workers fell between 1981 and 1999. In 1981 the raw ratio of  
log real hourly-wage between registered and non-registered workers was 1.08, but in 1999 it 
was down to 0.71. As non-registered workers are less likely to be found in the manufacturing 
sector, one could associate the fall in the proportion of registered workers with the reduction 
in the number of workers in the manufacturing sector. A lower proportion of “manufacturing 
jobs” would lead to a higher proportion of non-registered jobs in the whole economy. 
However, Figure 1 shows that the decrease in the proportion of registered workers was also 
observed in the manufacturing sector. From 86% in 1981, it was down to 77% in 1999.  
As for the wage differential between registered and non-registered workers in the 
manufacturing sector,
7 Figure 2 shows that it followed very closely the wage differential 
between registered and non-registered workers in the entire economy. There were minor 
differences in the intensity of the movements, but their directions were basically the same.  
The only difference is that the 1986 dip in the wage gap provoked by the unorthodox 
stabilisation Plan (Plano Cruzado) which frozen wages and prices, seems to have affected more 
the manufacturing sector than the wide-economy, whereas the 1990 dip in the wage gap due 
to the Plano Collor was not so strong in the manufacturing sector. The wage differential 
between registered and non-registered in the manufacturing sector that had peaked at 86% in 
1992 was down to 44% in 1999. 4  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
FIGURE 1 
Proportion of Registered Workers in the Manufacturing Sector  
1981 - 1999 










Wage Differential between Registered and Non-registered Workers in the Manufacturing Sector 
(In %) 1981 - 1999 












These figures reveal sharp movements in the time series of both the wage differential 
between registered and non-registered workers and the proportion of registered workers in 
the entire economy and in the manufacturing sector, in particular. Our aim is to establish 
whether the coincidence between the reduction in the wage differential between registered 
and non-registered workers and the fall in the proportion of registered workers and the end of 
the trade reforms was a mere coincidence or was really linked to the trade liberalisation 
measures. In the next section, we discuss the impact of trade liberalisation in developing 
countries labour market, and how it might have affected the wage differential between 
registered and non-registered workers in Brazil and the proportion of informal sector workers.    Fábio Veras Soares  5 
 
3  TRADE LIBERALISATION AND LABOUR MARKET 
3.1  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE IMPACT OF TRADE 
LIBERALISATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY LABOUR MARKETS 
The Hecksher-Ohlin theorem states that a country will tend to export goods that are relatively 
intensive in the abundant factor. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows that changes in the 
output price have a more than proportional effect on the return of the relatively abundant 
factor in the industry where the shock occurred. The combination of these two theorems yields 
the prediction that trade policy changes that lead to a higher relative price of unskilled-
intensive goods should bring about an increase in the relative wage of unskilled workers.
8  
Assuming the special case where the functional form of the production functions for all 
sectors and for the aggregate utility function is Cobb-Douglas, the proportional change in the 
relative wage rate between skilled workers ( ) s  and unskilled workers ( ) u  in an open economy 













Łł Łł   (1) 
where b 1  and b 2  are the proportion of skilled workers in the skilled-intensive sector and in 
the unskilled-intensive sector, respectively;  1 A  and  2 A  are technology parameters in these 
same sectors, and  1 P and  2 P  the respective product prices. Since  12 bb >  changes in prices 
and/or technology have a more than proportional effect on changes in the relative wage, an 
increase in  2 P , the price of the product in the unskilled-intensive sector, should lead to a more 
than proportional fall in the relative wage of the skilled workers.  
However the above result only holds if we assume that: 1) the economy is small so that it 
cannot affect the international price of the product, which is assumed to be exogenous, 2) the 
economy is inside the cone of diversification, meaning that tradable goods intensive in both 
factors, skilled and unskilled labour, are produced in that economy; 3) there is no product 
differentiation, i.e., foreign and domestic goods are perfect substitutes; and 4) there are no 
mobility barriers for workers to respond to wage changes. A corollary of this theory is that 
changes in the supply of different factors do not alter their relative prices (as changes in the 
relative price do). Changes in the factor endowment of a country would increase the 
production in the industries intensive in the factor, without altering its relative price (Johnson 
and Stafford, 1999).  
So far the empirical literature on the developing countries has found at best mixed results 
regarding HOS predictions. For the Mexican experience in the mid-1980s, Hanson and Harrison 
(1999) show that the reduction in tariff protection disproportionately affected low-skilled 
industries, contrary to what one would expect for a developing country. This is so, because the 
Mexican import substitution strategy extended trade protection preferentially to industries 
that made relatively intensive use of unskilled labour. The relative higher protection of 
industries in which the countries would, in principle, have comparative advantage was also 
noticed by Currie and Harrison (1997) for the Moroccan manufacturing sector. Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003) also found that the structure of tariff protection benefited more the industries 
with a higher share of unskilled workers in Colombia and in Brazil.
9 These studies highlight the 6  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
necessity to understand the previous structure of protection before assuming that any trade 
liberalisation reform would trigger a reduction in wage inequality, as measured by the relative 
wage between skilled and unskilled workers. If the protected sectors were the ones in which 
the country already had comparative advantage, then the openness measures could lead to a 
fall in their product prices and then trigger an increase in the relative demand for the scarce 
factor (skilled workers).  
Behrman et al. (2001) do not find evidence that trade liberalization has any overall 
widening effect on wage differentials for a panel of 18 Latin American countries – including 
Brazil – for the period 1977 to 1998. Robbins (1996a) also fails to find any relationship between 
trade liberalisation and wage inequality for Colombia. Gindling and Robbins (2001) find 
evidences consistent with a positive correlation between trade liberalisation and higher 
returns to education in Chile. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2001) find that manufacturing sectors 
where the import penetration increased the most, wage inequality also widened relatively 
more in favour of the most skilled workers in Argentina. Pavcnik et al. (2002) show that the 
increase in the return of the college-educated workers coincides with the trade liberalisation in 
Brazil. They do not find any relationship between trade related measures and the increase in 
wage premium in sectors more affected by the reform, but they do find that the sector specific 
skill premium did rise for skilled workers. Green et al. (2001) also stress the coincidence 
between trade liberalisation in Brazil and the increase in the relative wage of college-educated 
workers, but fail to find any causal relationship. Unlike Pavcnik et al. (2002), however, they do 
find that the wage premium increased in sectors more affected by the trade reform.
10 
Dickerson et al. (2001) using a pseudo panel approach find that the returns to education for 
college-educated workers fell after the trade liberalisation in Brazil, but do not find any 
correlation between trade measures and the return to education for college workers. Note that 
this result is at odds with Green et al. (2001). This is so due to the fact that the pseudo-cohort 
approach adopted by Dickerson et al. (2001) points to an overestimation of the returns to 
education yielded by the OLS method employed by Green et al. (2001). Arbache et al. (2004) 
reinforce the results in Green et al. (2002) and argue that within the traded sector, increasing 
openness was associated with lower wages but the downward impact of openness on wages 
was insignificant at the highest two education groups. Gonzaga et al. (2002) argue that the 
wage differential between skilled and non-skilled workers fell after trade liberalisation in Brazil 
and that the mechanism of transmission of this fall through tariff to prices and prices to wages 
is in line with HOS predictions.
11  
The lack of strong evidence for HOS implications in developing countries has been 
rationalised via three hypotheses. The first is related to the perception that developing 
countries with higher proportion of semi-skilled workers may have been suffering strong 
competition from countries with a higher proportion of unskilled workers (Wood, 1997 and 
Hanson and Harrison, 1999). This halfway position of some industrialised developing countries, 
mainly in Latin America, would prevent HOS framework from working.
12 The second 
hypothesis assumes that trade may have caused a higher contact with leading-edge 
technology. In order to install this newly available technology, firms might have demanded 
more skilled workers to operate them and to adapt the production process to this more 
efficient technology. Such reasoning is advocated by the skill-enhancing trade hypothesis due 
to capital-skill complementarity (Robbins, 1996b)
13 and by the learning-by-trade hypothesis 
(Pissarides, 1997). The third hypothesis argues that empirical studies fail to find any HOS trade 
related impact on income distribution because of global/pervasive skill biased technological 
change (Berman and Machin, 2000). In this case, no correlation between trade measures and   Fábio Veras Soares  7 
 
the increase in the premium of skilled workers would be observed, since this would be an 
economy-wide phenomenon.  
A second point that has been emphasized in the literature is the role of trade 
liberalisation in changing institutional features of industrial relations and then indirectly 
affecting the wage and employment structure (mainly in the manufacturing sector) of 
countries that have undertaken trade reforms. The main hypothesis has to do with the loss  
of union power triggered by trade reforms. Both the fall of trade barriers and tariff reductions 
increase the price elasticity of product demand, hence reducing rents that sustained the 
union wage premium.  
We will briefly report some results of empirical studies on the impact of trade reforms on 
relative wages. Driffil et al. (1998) show that when non-tariff barriers were reduced in Britain, 
the wages in the relevant establishments fell significantly. Revenga (1992) observes a similar 
effect associated with falls in import prices in the US. Lang (1998) argues that the small effect 
of trade liberalization in New Zealand on the composition of employment suggests that the 
effect of tariffs on wages and firms’ monopoly power, reducing both of them, eliminated any 
effect on the distribution of employment. Borjas and Ramey (1995) show that the impact of 
international trade on relative wages (skilled/unskilled wages) depends on the market 
structure of the industry affected. They argue that many of durable good industries in the US in 
the 1980’s that employed a disproportionate share of less educated workers were highly 
concentrated, earned significant rents, and shared those rents with their workers by paying 
them higher-than-average wages. Their empirical evidence shows that employment changes 
in a small group of trade-impacted concentrated industries can explain not only part of the 
aggregate rise in wage inequality in the US, but also some of the differences in trends in wage 
inequality across metropolitan areas. Somewhat against those findings, Johnson and Stafford 
(1999) in their review of the impact of trade on labour market institutions argued that despite 
the theoretical negative relationship between increased international competition and 
“monopoly rents” enjoyed by the firms protected in the past, there is no strong evidence of a 
negative effect of increased trade on unionism either in the US or in the UK.  
The findings on the impact of trade-related variables on wages and on employment for 
developing countries also tend to place this sort of rent-sharing argument as a possible 
explanation for decreases in the average wage, at least, in the manufacturing sector. Arbache 
(1999) argues that the marked-oriented reforms in Brazil, and particularly trade liberalisation, 
led to a higher demand for skilled workers that ended up increasing union power. This 
happened because unlike developed countries, the unionized workers are relatively more 
educated in Brazil than non-unionized workers. Revenga (1997) finds evidences that the 
(negative) impact of trade liberalisation on wages in Mexico was higher than the (negative) 
effect on employment. She argues that this fact may be explained by the prevalence of rent-
sharing schemes in the period previous to trade liberalisation. Such schemes would have 
allowed unions and firms to agree in cutting “excessive wages” rather than adjusting the 
employment margin after the reforms. Similarly, Currie and Harrison (1997) analysing the 
Moroccan trade liberalisation argue that in an imperfect competitive framework where some 
rents were captured by workers in the form of higher wages, firms could also respond to their 
rent loss by cutting wages and substituting temporary workers for permanent ones. Menezes-
Filho and Arbache (2002) show evidences of rent-sharing for unionized workers in the 
manufacturing sector in Brazil. However, they also find that the increase in quasi-rents brought 
about by trade liberalization was not shared with unionized workers.
14 8  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
3.2  TRADE LIBERALISATION AND SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKET 
The impact of trade liberalisation on the informal sector is less understood and less 
documented. Behrman (1999) points out that most studies have focused on the impact of 
trade liberalisation on the formal manufacturing sector, but less is known about its effect on 
the informal sector, both in the manufacturing sector
15 and in the entire labour market. In this 
section, we will highlight possible effects of trade liberalisation on segmentation – in terms of 
the registered versus non-registered classification – in Brazil.  
The first thing to notice about the relationship between trade liberalisation and the 
relative wage of registered and non-registered workers is that such a classification is an 
institutional feature and not a skill-based classification. Unlike the classifications by 
educational attainment; occupational categories; production and non-production workers as 
traditionally used in the literature and that are based on productivity related features; the 
classification between registered and non-registered workers parallels the classifications 
between union/non-union workers and/or temporary/permanent workers, which are much 
more related to institutional features of the labour market. The second thing to notice is that 
the informal sector has been traditionally linked to the non-tradable sector, leading to the view 
that the informal sector would not be affected directly by trade liberalisation. 
The presence of a non-tradable sector where non-registered status is prevalent, however, 
would not affect the predictions according to the model we presented in the last section, i.e., 
the world prices of good 1 and 2 would still determine the relative wage as in equation (1). 
Nevertheless, the presence of a non-tradable sector with such characteristic would make the 
cone of diversification of that country thinner, and more likely that a fall in the relative price 
of the “non-registered” prevalent good would lead that industry to close down so that non-
registered workers would be employed only in the non-tradable sector (Johnson and 
Stafford, 1999). In this case, equation (1) would no longer represent the skilled/unskilled  
(or registered/non-registered) wage rate. The relative wage would be determined as in the 
















Łł Łł   (2) 
where the subscript 4 stands for the non-tradable sector 4, which is “non-registered” prevalent 
and unskilled intensive.  
It is clear from (2) that regardless of the changes in prices in the tradable sector, the 
relative wage would be unaffected. In this context, one should not expect to find any effect of 
trade-related variables on the relative wage of skilled/unskilled workers or registered/non-
registered workers. Midway situations between the result of the closed model represented by 
equation (2) and the open model in equation (1) arise if one assumes that a) domestic and 
foreign goods are not perfectly substitutes and b) labour types cannot move in response to 
wage changes (Johnson and Stafford, 1999).  
In fact, some commentators have used the tradable versus non-tradable approach to 
explain the dichotomy between formal versus informal sector in Brazil.
16 The idea behind this 
correspondence is that the earnings of workers in the informal (non-tradable sector) is 
determined by supply and demand in that sector, whereas the earnings of workers in the   Fábio Veras Soares  9 
 
formal sector is determined by the external demand for the export goods. The demand for the 
national manufactured product would be lower after the trade reform due to the access to 
cheaper products, whereas the non-tradable sector would be protected from that competition. 
The difficulty in such argument is how to justify the lack of mobility between workers from the 
formal to the informal sector. It could be argued that the informal sector would act as a 
cushion for workers displaced from the tradable sector, leading to a downward pressure on 
wages in that sector. Therefore, it is not clear how trade liberalisation would affect the wage of 
the employees in the tradable sector, but would not affect the wage of the employees in the 
non-tradable sector.
17  
This sort of argument would be more justifiable in a context of imperfect competition 
where one would focus on the effect of trade reforms on institutional features of developing 
country labour markets. In this framework, trade reform would squeeze rents that would 
have been captured by protected firms and shared with their employees. As seen above, if 
the protected firms were the ones abundant in the scarce factor (skilled labour) then one 
should expect under HOS assumptions that the reduction or elimination of trade barriers 
would reallocate resources to the now more competitive firms based on the abundant factor 
and hence increase the demand for unskilled labour. However, as many papers have shown 
this is not necessarily the case, and the protected sector may have been in fact the one that 
had a higher proportion of the abundant factor. Alternatively, if the protected sector cannot 
be characterised as perfectly competitive, then there is space for some sort of rent sharing. 
Therefore, workers in most affected industries would experience a reduction in their 
bargaining power – and so in their wages – since the ground for rent sharing would be 
reduced. Assuming that the most protected sectors are the ones with a higher proportion of 
registered workers, or where registered workers profit more from rents thanks to the market 
power of their firms, one should observe a reduction in the wage premium for registered 
workers after the reforms.  
In Brazil registered workers are more likely to be unionised and to work in large firms, 
which are more likely to have market power and therefore to have some loss due to trade 
liberalisation. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that the degree of segmentation, as 
measured by the wage premium for registered workers, is positively correlated with trade 
protection measures.
18 The process of trade liberalisation should hence curb the wage 
differential between registered and non-registered workers. Besides this direct effect, skilled 
workers displaced from registered jobs may have joined the pool of non-registered workers, 
increasing their average skill level and contributing to the reduction in the wage differential 
due to changes in the composition of the two groups 
So far we have focused on wage differential, but as mentioned above, trade liberalisation 
can also affect the allocation of different type of workers between and within industries.  
In particular, Brazilian firms may have reacted to the trade liberalisation shock not only by 
substituting non-registered workers for registered workers, but also sub-contracting part of 
the tasks that they could have performed earlier in an attempt to reduce costs.
19 The 
reallocation of part of the production to smaller firms may have led to a higher participation of 
the non-registered workers in the pool of manufacturing employee. Similarly, the reduction in 
absolute terms of the number of jobs in the manufacturing sector due to adjustments in the 
size and composition of its workforce may have led to an increase in the proportion of non-
registered workers in the entire economy.  10  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
Most of these channels are hard to assess since there is no available and compatible data 
on “informal firms” in Brazil that would allow one to compare its performance over the recent 
period with the performance of medium to large firms.
20 Nevertheless, data from the Brazilian 
annual household survey (PNAD) shows that the proportion of non-registered workers 
increased in the manufacturing sector from 15% to 24% from 1981 to 1999, which is a clear 
indication of a possible lower degree of compliance within the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore the proportion of workers in small firms (up to ten employees) increased from 
40% to 50% in the entire economy and from 15% to 23% in the manufacturing sector during 
the same period. These changes may have two causes: a) more firms decided to contract 
workers illegally; b) the balance on the birth and death of firms favoured smaller firms that are 
more likely to employ non-registered workers. Somewhat supporting this latter hypothesis, 
Muendler (2001), based on an unbalanced panel of medium to large size manufacturing firms, 
finds that in the period 1992-1998, the probability of transition from active status to extinct 
(shut down), and from suspended to extinct had increased considerably in comparison to the 
period 1986-1990. This evidence lends some support to the argument that there was a clean 
up effect among medium to large firms after trade liberalisation that may have led to a 
reduction in the proportion of registered workers. In the next section we will describe the main 
characteristics of the trade liberalisation process.  
4  SOME FEATURES OF THE TRADE LIBERALISATION  
PROCESS IN BRAZIL 
The process of trade liberalisation in Brazil started in 1988, but only gained pace after 1990. 
The structure of protection of the national production was very complex. Besides high tariffs,  
it included several non-tariff barriers along with special regimes that exempted some sectors 
of paying standard import tax. One of the most important restrictions was the “law of national 
similar” which forbade the import of any product that had an equivalent/similar produced in 
Brazil (Moreira and Correia, 1998). There were also import quotas for firms and the need to get 
permission one-year in advance to import.  
According to Kume et al. (2000) the trade liberalisation process in Brazil can be divided  
in three phases. The first period between 1988-1989 consisted in scrapping redundancies in 
tariffs, i.e., in cutting the excessive and unnecessary level of tariffs that is more than sufficient 
to compensate for the difference between the world price and the domestic price, and in the 
partial reduction of special regimes.
21 The second period 1990-1993 witnessed the elimination 
of all special regimes for imports except for Zona Franca de Manaus (Manaus Duty Free Zone) 
and for the computer industry; the elimination of all non-tariff barriers and a schedule for a 
gradual reduction of tariffs during four years from 1990 onwards. The programme intended to 
reduce by a lower amount the tariffs of sectors more intensive in technology such as computer 
and chemical industries and those with a high demand for national input products such as the 
automobile industry. It also intended to reduce more sharply, in the beginning of the reform, 
the tariffs on capital and intermediate goods, and later on the tariffs on consumption goods. 
However, in order to tighten up the price control of oligopoly groups and curb the inflationary 
process, the government decided to anticipate the lowering of tariffs for consumption goods. 
For this reason, in October 1992, the tariffs were reduced to the levels that were scheduled for 
January 1993 and in July 1993 to the levels that were scheduled for January 1994. Such   Fábio Veras Soares  11 
 
anticipations announced in February 1992 reinforce the natural experiment environment in 
which the process of trade liberalisation took place in Brazil. The third and last period consisted 
of the anticipation of the Mercosur Common Tariff from January 1995 to September 1994 and 
of the reduction of tariffs to 0% for intermediate goods and 2% for consumption goods which 
figured prominently in the bundle of goods that compounded the price indices in order to 
control inflation just after the Plano Rea.l
22  
The partial reversion in the tariff reduction observed from 1995 onwards was followed by 
other measures that intended to reduce the trade deficit. Among these measures were the 
reintroduction of some non-tariff barriers such as previous authorisation for some imports and 
increases in red tape in general. However, in spite of a short-term reduction in the growth rate 
of the import penetration ratio, these measures were not able to prevent the increase in the 
foreign market penetration.  
Table 1 reports the evolution of the nominal tariff between 1987 and 1998 and of the 
import penetration coefficient between 1989 and 1998. As one can see, not only did the 
process of trade liberalisation lead to a decrease in the average value of nominal tariffs, but 
also to a reduction in the dispersion of their level among industries. In 1987, the average 
nominal tariff was 55% with a standard deviation of 21.3. These figures were down to 13.4% 
and 6.6, respectively in 1998.  
TABLE 1 
Nominal Tariff and Import Penetration Coefficient  
(In %)  
  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Average tariff   54.9  37.7  29.4  27.2  20.9  14.1  12.5  10.2  10.8  10.8  13.4  13.4 
sd  21.3  14.6  15.8  14.9  12.7  8.2  6.7  5.9  7.4  8.7  7.6  6.6 
Max  102.7  76.0  75.0  78.7  58.7  39.0  34.0  23.5  41.0  52.4  47.1  38.1 
Min  15.6  5.6  1.9  3.3  1.7  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Imp. Penetration       4.4  4.2  6.0  6.1  6.9  7.7  10.0  10.7  12.5  13.00 
Source: Kume et al. (2000) for the average Nominal Tariff in % (weighted by free-trade value-added) 
Fonseca et al. (2000) for the import penetration coefficient in the manufacturing sector in %. 
Despite this sharp fall in tariffs, imports did not increase immediately. This occurred 
because the process of trade liberalisation took place during the recession period 1990-92 and 
in a period when the currency was depreciated. Furthermore, as mentioned above, a 
considerable part of the reduction in the late 1980’s was due to cuts in redundant tariffs.  
The import participation in the total supply increased from 3.78% in 1985 to 4.05% in 1992, 
and by 1997, this figure was up to 5.67% (Oliveira-Junior, 2000). Similarly, the import 
penetration ratio was 6.1% in 1992 (the same level as in 1985) and increased to 13% by 1998 
(Fonseca et al., 2000). An important point to note is the possible lack of a direct relationship 
between either the nominal tariff or effective tariff
23 and import penetration ratio
24 across 
sectors. As discussed above, there were many non-tariff barriers preventing imports as well as 
special regimes that allowed protected sector to import inputs without paying the due 
amount of import tax. Moreover import penetration ratio captures other features that are not 
captured by tariff measures such as the level of the real exchange rate and tastes and 
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5  EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES 
In order to test whether or not trade liberalisation did have an effect on the degree of 
segmentation and on the expansion of the informal sector in either the manufacturing sector 
or in the entire labour market, we apply three distinct reduced-form strategies. Since tariffs are 
uniform within the country in a given period of time, the first strategy relies on the variation of 
the degree of protection enjoyed by different industries, and on the different speed of the 
reform for different industries as described in the last section. This strategy allows us to check 
whether the industries most affected by the trade reform were also those that experienced the 
strongest reduction in both the degree of segmentation as measured by the wage differential 
and in the proportion of registered workers. Thus, in order to avoid bias due to the correlation 
between unobserved industry specific characteristics and trade related variables, we estimate 
this relationship using industry fixed-effect models and time dummies.
25 Controlling for time 
invariant unobserved industry characteristics is important because industry features that affect 
the relative wage of registered workers (and its proportion) may also affect their ability to 
lobby the government and/or the government priority in tariff reduction.
26 Likewise, time 
dummies would control for common macroeconomic shocks that would affect both the 
relative wage and the proportion of registered workers and the behaviour of trade related 
variables. For instance, during a recession it is likely that the import penetration ratio would fall 
as well as the relative wage of informal sector workers, whereas the proportion of workers in 
that sector increases. If the recessive period coincides with the trade liberalisation measures 
and we do not control for this common macroeconomic shock we would find a spurious 
relationship between the wage gap and the size of the informal sector and the trade measures.  
The second strategy is based on the fact that the industries are not evenly distributed 
within the country. Thus if we assume that regions are differently affected by the trade reform 
according to their “industry composition” and that there is some sort of regional segmentation 
that prevents workers from migrating in the short term, we can test the existence of spillover 
effect of the trade liberalisation into the entire economy due to the different intensities with 
which each region was affected by the reform.  
The third strategy adds two other sources of variation to estimate the impact of trade 
liberalisation on the proportion of registered workers and on their wage premium in the wide 
economy. We build industry-cohort cells that account for 30 sectors in the economy
27 –
including both tradable and non-tradable sectors – and seven 10-year length cohorts. Thus we 
are able to exploit both cohort
28 and industry variation in order to identify the impact of trade 
liberalisation measures on employment structure and on the wage differential in the 
manufacturing sector. This is possible, because besides the different impact of the trade 
liberalisation on the manufacturing industries, we will also be using the non-tradable 
industries as a comparison group. These three identification strategies are detailed below.  
5.1  THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
To test whether or not trade liberalisation had any impact on the fall in the wage differential 
between the registered and non-registered workers and on the increase in the proportion of 
the non-registered workers in the pool of manufacturing employees between 1987 and 
1998, we run a fixed-effect model for both the coefficient of the “registered worker” dummy 
variable obtained from a standard semi-log Mincerian wage equation and the proportion of   Fábio Veras Soares  13 
 
registered workers on a set of variables related to trade: effective tariff, nominal tariff,
29 
import penetration ratio and export orientation
30 for a panel of 17 industries.
31 The industry 
classification was developed in order to make the data from the household survey 
compatible with the trade-related data used in this paper. The sample is restricted to 
employed individuals between 14 and 65 years old with positive earnings and who worked 
more than 20 hours per week.  
In the case of the effect of trade openness measures on the wage differential, we first 
estimate the following log wage equation for each pair of industry  j  and year t separately 
between 1987 and 1998.  
 
ijtjtjtijtjtijtijt wXReg abe =+G++   (3) 
where  ijt w  is the log of the real hourly-wage for the individual i in industry  j  and year t  
and G is a vector of coefficients of the following independent variables  X : region, gender, 
education (6 groups), experience, experience squared and metropolitan area, and b jt   
is the coefficient for the dummy variable Reg that indicates whether the individual is a 
registered worker.  
In a second step, we regress the estimate coefficient b jt  on the trade-related variables:
32  
 
jtjtjtjt TM badfqe =++++   (4) 
where TM jt  stands for trade measure variables in period  j  and time t and f t  are industry 
dummies and q t  are time period dummies and e jt  is assumed to be a white noise.  
The second reduced-form estimates refers to the impact of trade-related measures on the 
proportion of registered workers in the industries:
33  
 
2 jtjtjtjt PregTM alfqe =++++   (5) 
where Preg jt  is the proportion of registered worker in industry  j  and year t and the 
remaining variables are as stated in equation (4).  
The fixed-effect regression versions of equation (4) are weighted by the inverse of the 
sampling variance of the dependent variable. Saxonhouse (1976) shows that estimations 
where the dependent variable is estimated in a first step and then regressed against a set 
of variables intended to explain it, suffer from heteroscedasticity because the stochastic 
term in the first stage is individual specific (in our case, industry specific). Similarly, 
equation (5) is estimated using the share of the industry in the total manufacturing 
employment as weight. Besides this weighting scheme, the standard errors in both 
equations are Huber-White corrected for any other source of general heteroscedasticity.  
We run separate regressions for each trade measure and a joint one with effective 
tariff, import penetration and export orientation, we also include other variables related 
to the structure of the industry in order to test the robustness of the results. These 
variables are value-added,
34 and the proportion of workers who earn less than the 
minimum wage. Additionally, we run one specification adding the industry-specific 14  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
nominal exchange rate
35 to the joint specification. The set of regressions also contains 
year dummies aimed at capturing aggregate shocks that may have had some impact on 
all manufacturing industries.  
Table 2 summarises the results of the fixed-effect with time dummies of the 
estimations for the wage premium as measured by the registered worker’s dummy 
coefficient. Both effective and nominal tariffs have a (small) positive, but statistically 
insignificant coefficient. In contrast, the specification with import penetration as the only 
regressor shows a negative and significant coefficient (00042) -. . This results is robust to the 
inclusion of the other trade-related variables in column [5] and to industry characteristics 
(column[7]), as well as to the inclusion of the log of the industry-specific nominal exchange 
rate in column [6]. The inclusion of the latter variable aims at preventing the trade-related 
variables, particularly the import penetration ratio, from spuriously capturing the effect of 
different trends in the industry-specific exchange rates. The inclusion of industry-specific 
exchange rate does not affect either the sign or the statistical significance of the coefficients 
of the other trade-related variables. However, it slightly diminishes the negative effect of the 
import penetration ratio. The estimates range from  00033 -.  to  00064 -. .
36 The export 
orientation variable has a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient in all 
specifications. All additional controls have a positive effect on the wage premium, as 
expected, but they are never statistically significant.  
TABLE 2 
Regressions for Wage Premium: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies  
(Contemporaneous Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
0.0008        0.0007  0.0008  -0.0003 
Effective Tariff 
[0.0007]        [0.0007]  [0.0007]  [0.0009] 
  0.0009           
Nominal Tariff 
  [0.0013]           
    -0.0042    -0.0039  -0.0033  -0.0064 
Import Penetration 
    [0.0013]**    [0.0013]**  [0.0015]*  [0.0015]** 
      -0.0011  -0.0009  -0.0004  -0.0004 
Export Orientation 
      [0.0016]  [0.0016]  [0.0017]  [0.0021] 
          -0.0096   
Exchange Rate 
          [0.0089]   
            0.6548 
% workers w<mw 
            [0.3437] 
            0.0131 
Value Added 
            [0.0503] 
0.4076  0.4152  0.4669  0.4711  0.4132  0.2252  0.0640 
Constant 
[0.0604]**  [0.0844]**  [0.0327]**  [0.0323]**  [0.0600]**  [0.1876]  [1.1551] 
N  170  170  170  170  170  170  153 
Adj. R2  0.71  0.71  0.72  0.71  0.72  0.72  0.73 
F test: industry  19.18  18.48  21.24  16.20  19.62  19.86  15.33 
Prob >F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets.   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
Industry and time dummy variables not shown.   
Note: As we do not have data on value-added for 1998, specifications that include it have their sample size reduced 
form 170 to 153.   Fábio Veras Soares  15 
 
These results suggest that trade liberalisation as measured by the import penetration ratio 
had a diminishing effect on the wage differential between registered and non-registered in the 
manufacturing sector. Overall something between 10% and 14% of the 42% decrease in the 
wage gap in the manufacturing sector can be attributed to the 10% increase in the import 
penetration ratio observed in the period. As for the other trade measures directly affected by 
the reform, the coefficients for nominal and effective tariff is correctly signed as we would 
expect based on our discussion in the last section, i.e., they have a positive impact on the 
registered workers wage premium, but they are very small and not statistically significant.  
The regressions for the proportion of registered workers in the pool of employees 
were weighted by the share of workers in the industry for each industry/year pair.  
The standard errors are Huber-White corrected. Table 3 shows the results for the fixed 
effect specifications with time dummies. Both effective and nominal tariffs have a 
negative effect on the proportion of registered workers for all specifications, and their 
coefficients are significant for most of them.
37 The coefficients for the import 
penetration ratio and for the export orientation are not significant, but while the 
import penetration ratio shows a negative impact in most specifications, the export 
orientation has a positive impact in all specifications.
38 The proportion of workers 
earning below the minimum wage is, as expected, negatively correlated with the 
proportion of registered workers. Including the industry-specific exchange rate does 
not change the coefficient (column [6]) of the other variables.  
TABLE 3 
Regressions for the Proportion of Registered Workers: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies 
(Contemporaneous Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
-0.0003        -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0002  Effective Tariff 
[0.0001]**        [0.0001]**  [0.0001]**  [0.0001] 
  -0.0003            Nominal Tariff 
  [0.0002]           
    -0.0002    -0.0003  -0.0003  0.0001  Import Penetration 
    [0.0003]    [0.0002]  [0.0003]  [0.0002] 
      0.0006  0.0008  0.0008  0.0006  Export Orientation 
      [0.0004]  [0.0004]*  [0.0004]  [0.0004]* 
          -0.0001    Exchange Rate 
          [0.0021]   
            -0.2753  % workers w<mw 
            [0.0709]** 
            -0.0021  Value Added 
            [0.2346] 
0.6976  0.6916  0.6713  0.6705  0.6980  0.6962  0.7529  Constant 
[0.0116]**  [0.0166]**  [0.0087]**  [0.0090]**  [0.0118]**  [0.0421]**  [0.0197]** 
N  170  170  170  170  170  170  153 
Adj. R2  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97 
F test: industry  289.89  280.66  227.76  302.16  203.25  203.19  46.03 
Prob >F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Industry and time dummy variables not shown.  
Note: As we do not have data on value-added for 1998, column [7] specification has only 153 observations.  16  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 are somewhat puzzling. Whereas the import penetration 
ratio seems to have had a negative impact on the wage differential, it has not affected 
(significantly) the proportion of registered workers, despite its negative sign in most 
specifications. The effective tariff has had no effect on the wage differential (despite its 
positive sign), but it has had a negative impact on the proportion of registered workers. 
Thus, industries most affected by the reduction in effective tariff were the same that 
witnessed an increase in the proportion of registered workers. Therefore, at least for the 
manufacturing sector, trade liberalisation may have had an impact on cutting the wage 
premia of registered workers, but if anything, it had the effect of increasing the proportion of 
registered workers in the most affected industries.  
In order to check the robustness of these results, allowing for some delay in the 
adjustments to the new tariffs and to the more competitive environment, and also to avoid 
problems of simultaneity between import penetration ratio and export-orientation and the 
wage differential, we re-run equations (4) and (5) using lagged regressors rather than 
contemporaneous.  
As for the results for the wage premium, Table 4 reveals that the main difference is that 
the coefficient of effective tariff is negative in most specifications, but again it is never 
statistically significant. The coefficients of export orientation turn out to be positive for most 
the fixed-effect specifications with time dummies, but they are not significant either. The 
coefficients for import penetration are negative and show a point estimate somewhat higher 
than the one with contemporaneous effect, ranging from  00048 -.  to  00064 -. . The inclusion 
of the lagged industry-specific exchange rate does not change this result (see column [6]).  
TABLE 4 
Regression for Wage Premium: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies  
(Lagged Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
0.0002        -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0003  Effective Tariff 
[0.0008]        [0.0008]  [0.0008]  [0.0009] 
  -0.0005            Nominal Tariff 
  [0.0014]           
    -0.0048    -0.0061  -0.0055  -0.0064  Import Penetration 
    [0.0016]**    [0.0016]**  [0.0019]**  [0.0022]** 
      -0.0001  0.0013  0.0018  0.0018  Export Orientation 
      [0.0019]  [0.0022]  [0.0023]  [0.0026] 
          -0.0078    Exchange Rate 
          [0.0079]   
            -0.1119  % workers w<mw 
            [0.6606] 
            -0.0418  Value Added 
            [0.0458] 
Constant  0.3861  0.5788  0.4703  0.4693  0.3928  0.3931  1.2582 
  [0.0349]**  [0.0979]**  [0.0328]**  [0.0321]**  [0.0367]**  [0.1704]*  [1.0235] 
N  153  153  170  170  153  153  119 
Adj. R2  0.71  0.71  0.72  0.71  0.72  0.72  0.70 
F test: industry  16.32  15.26  20.32  15.00  17.75  18.05  9.05 
Prob >F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Industry and time dummy variables not shown.  
Note: As we do not have data on value-added for 1998, column [7] specification has only 153 observations.    Fábio Veras Soares  17 
 
As for the results for the proportion of registered workers, Table 5 shows that the use 
of a lagged specification instead of contemporaneous does not change the former results. 
Moreover, using the probability of registered job as the dependent variables as suggested 




Regression for the Proportion of Registered Workers: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies  
(Lagged Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
-0.0003        -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0001 
Effective Tariff 
[0.0001]*        [0.0001]*  [0.0001]*  [0.0002] 
  -0.0004           
Nominal Tariff 
  [0.0003]           
    -0.0001    -0.0001  0.0000  0.0003 
Import Penetration 
    [0.0003]    [0.0003]  [0.0005]  [0.0004] 
      0.0004  0.0001  0.0002  0.0006 
Export Orientation 
      [0.0005]  [0.0004]  [0.0005]  [0.0005] 
          -0.0018   
Exchange Rate 
          [0.0022]   
            -0.3490 
% workers w<mw 
            [0.0653]** 
            0.0183 
Value Added 
            [0.0114] 
0.6419  0.6435  0.6716  0.6714  0.6419  0.6560  0.3663 
Constant 
[0.0087]**  [0.0089]**  [0.0088]**  [0.0088]**  [0.0088]**  [0.0451]**  [0.2617] 
N  153  153  170  170  153  153  119 
Adj. R2  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97 
F test: industry  266.07  244.75  226.28  310.58  193.33  194.34  42.10 
Prob >F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
Industry and time dummy variables not shown.  
Note: As we do not have data on value-added for 1998, column [7] specification has only 153 observations.  
Altogether, the results for both set of equations suggest that trade reforms as measured 
by the import penetration ratio had a diminishing effect in the wage differential between 
registered and non-registered workers. However, they also suggest that trade liberalisation did 
not play any role in the increase of the proportion of non-registered workers in the 
manufacturing sector. If anything, the effective tariff seems to have a negative impact on the 
proportion of registered workers and no role in the diminishing wage differential between the 
two groups. Nevertheless, the narrowing effect of the increase in the import penetration ratio 
on the wage gap seems to be more robust than the effect of effective tariff on the proportion 
of registered workers. Using lagged regressors does not change the results for the wage 
differential, but it does change for the proportion of registered workers when more controls 
are added. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the effective tariff does not take into 
account the lifting of important trade barriers that may have affected the actual degree of 
competitiveness in the industry. This effect is captured, at least partially, by the import 
penetration ratio.  18  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
5.2  SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
In order to check whether the process of trade liberalisation had any impact beyond the 
supposedly direct effect on the manufacturing labour market, we run some fixed-effect models 
exploiting the different composition of the manufacturing sector in different regions of the 
country. The idea is to assess whether or not the economy-wide narrowing of the wage gap 
between formal and informal workers can be attributed to the trade liberalisation process.
40 
To implement that, we use the wage gap in different regions as the dependent variables and 
the trade measures as the regressors. As there is no regional variation in the trade measures 
since these data are only available at national level, we use the following strategy: we take the 
share of workers in each of the 17 industries in 1987 within the following eight regions: 
metropolitan Southeast, non-metropolitan Southeast, metropolitan South, non-metropolitan 
South, metropolitan Northeast, non-metropolitan Northeast, North and Midwest, and multiply 
this share by the effective and nominal tariffs, by the import penetration ratio and by export 
orientation ratio for each industry, and calculated the regional weighted average for each of 
these variables. These modified trade-related variables would indicate the intensity with which 
each regional labour market must have been affected by trade liberalisation. The source of 
variation now comes from the different degrees of protection between industries and from 
their regional dispersion within the country.  
One caveat of this procedure is that trade liberalisation is likely to have led to a 
reallocation of the industries within the country. In order to face a more competitive 
environment firms are likely to move to places where their costs can be lowered. This is one of 
the reasons why we choose to use a fixed weight - the industry structure in 1987.  
It is important to bear in mind that the results for this set of equations are not comparable 
to the previous one, since now we are looking at the effect of trade liberalisation on the 
economy-wide wage differential between registered and non-registered workers and on the 
economy-wide proportion of registered workers in the economy, and not only in the 
manufacturing sector. Equations (3), (4), and (5) may be rewritten as:  
 
3 irtrtirtrtirtirt wZReg abe =+L++   (6) 
where w irt  is the log of the real hourly-wage for the individual i in region r and year t and L 
is a vector of coefficients correspondent to the following independent variables Z : gender, 
education (6 groups), experience, experience squared, and b rt  is the coefficient for the 
dummy variable Reg that indicates whether the individual is a registered worker or not.  
 
4 rtrtrtrt TM bapmqe =++++  (7) 
where TM stands for trade measures variables as defined above, m r  are region dummies and 
t q , time period dummies and e rt  is assumed to be a white noise.  
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where Preg is the proportion of registered workers in region r and year t and the remaining 
variables are as stated in equation (5).  
The fixed-effect with time dummies versions of equation (7) are weighted by the inverse 
of the sampling variance of the dependent variable, whereas the fixed-effects with time 
dummies versions of equation (8) are weighted by the share of workers in each region. We also 
include additional controls in one of the specifications in order to check the robustness of the 
results. The controls are: proportion of workers employed in the manufacturing sector in each 
region, and the proportion of worker who earn less than the minimum wage.  
Table 6 shows the results for the estimation of equation (7) with year and region dummies 
using regional variation to identify the impact of trade related variables on the entire labour 
market. The effective and nominal tariffs have a negative and insignificant effect on wage 
differential between registered and non-registered workers. The sign of the import 
penetration ratio and of the export orientation are very sensitive according to the 
specification, but they are never significant. The only variable that is statistically significant in 
the specifications showed in Table 6 is the proportion of workers earning less than the 
minimum wage that has a positive impact on the wage premium of registered workers. 
Therefore, it seems that the trade-related variables did not have any impact on the behaviour 
of the wage differential in terms of its regional variation.  
TABLE 6 
Regression for Regional Wage Premium: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies  
(Contemporaneous Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
-0.005616        -0.006354  -0.003711 
Regional Effective Tariff 
[0.003032]        [0.003841]  [0.003809] 
  -0.005470         
Regional Nominal Tariff 
  [0.005242]         
    0.005169    0.008033  -0.000470 
Regional Import Penetration 
    [0.010112]    [0.008984]  [0.008203] 
      -0.005762  0.001539  -0.000944 
Regional Export Orientation 
      [0.012008]  [0.015678]  [0.017714] 
          -0.217793  Proportion of workers in 
Manufacturing            [0.345291] 
          0.639823 
          [0.291847]*  % workers earning less than mw 
           
Constant  0.659821  0.650932  0.622713  0.626998  0.662332  0.648209 
  [0.033614]**  [0.039330]**  [0.028562]**  [0.029977]**  [0.034016]**  [0.373064] 
N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
Adj. R2  0.91  0.91  0.90  0.90  0.91  0.91 
F test: industry  63.34  63.41  61.34  60.31  58.98  14.06 
Prob >F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
Region and time dummy variables not shown.  
As for the proportion of registered workers in the pool of employees, Table 7 shows that 
the import penetration ratio coefficients are negative for three specifications, but it is not 
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the other hand, have a positive and significant effect on the proportion of registered workers. 
Both nominal and effective tariff have a positive, but insignificant effect. As for the other 
controls, it is quite remarkable the positive impact of the proportion of workers employed on 
the manufacturing sector and the negative effect of the proportion of workers earning below 
the minimum wage on the proportion of registered workers. If anything, we could only say 
from these results that there is some weak evidence that import penetration ratio is negatively 
correlated with the proportion of registered workers and some strong evidence that the export 
orientation ratio is positively correlated with the proportion of registered workers.  
TABLE 7 
Regression for Regional Proportion of Registered Workers: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies 
(Contemporaneous Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
0.003072        0.001908  0.000015 
Regional Effective Tariff 
[0.002121]        [0.001979]  [0.001120] 
  0.003283         
Regional Nominal Tariff 
  [0.002945]         
    -0.013051    -0.017194  -0.001762 
Regional Import Penetration 
    [0.005686]*    [0.005023]**  [0.002364] 
      0.012750  0.013671  0.006479 
Regional Export Orientation 
      [0.004933]*  [0.004381]**  [0.003039]* 
          0.839754  Proportion of workers in 
Manufacturing            [0.125824]** 
          -0.375648 
          [0.073687]**  % workers earning less than mw 
           
Constant  0.633378  0.637003  0.656274  0.645894  0.635496  -0.023001 
  [0.012382]**  [0.019419]**  [0.012439]**  [0.012284]**  [0.011026]**  [0.126030] 
N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
Adj. R2  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.98  0.99 
F test: industry  395.20  409.92  426.82  527.53  576.04  141.30 
Prob >F  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Region and time dummy variables not shown.  
The results above suggest that import penetration ratio affects negatively the 
proportion of registered workers in the entire economy when we use regional variation to 
identify the impact of trade liberalisation. Regions with industries more affected by the 
higher import penetration were the regions that witnessed a higher decrease in the 
proportion of registered workers. Similarly, regions with industries with a high export 
orientation ratio witness an increase in the proportion of registered workers. However, unlike 
the specifications for the manufacturing sector, there has been no evidence that trade-
related measures have affected the wage differential between registered and non-registered 
workers under this identification strategy.  
The re-estimation of (7) and (8) using lagged regressors instead of contemporaneous 
yields very similar results for the impact of the trade-related measures on the wage differential. 
Table 8 shows that there is no indication of any impact of trade liberalisation on the wage 
differential. However, for the impact of trade-related measures on the proportion of registered 
workers the story is somewhat different. Table 9 shows that the import penetration ratio has 
now a positive, but not significant effect on the proportion of registered workers. Furthermore, 
the positive effect of the export orientation ratio becomes insignificant.    Fábio Veras Soares  21 
 
TABLE 8 
Regression for Regional Wage Premium: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies  
(Lagged Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
-0.006393        -0.006038  0.001440 
Regional Effective Tariff 
[0.005678]        [0.006716]  [0.007599] 
  -0.004922         
Regional Nominal Tariff 
  [0.008077]         
    -0.034032    -0.028870  -0.018030 
Regional Import Penetration 
    [0.025302]    [0.026758]  [0.027799] 
      -0.007305  0.004199  -0.010641 
Regional Export Orientation 
      [0.011589]  [0.017899]  [0.022503] 
          -0.163564 
Proportion of workers in Manufacturing 
          [0.371722] 
          0.820167 
          [0.426472]  % workers earning less than mw 
           
Constant  0.690690  0.687941  0.645335  0.639479  0.694627  0.489913 
  [0.042675]**  [0.042119]**  [0.027623]**  [0.027924]**  [0.044029]**  [0.458521] 
N  59  59  65  65  59  59 
Adj. R2  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.91 
F test: industry  47.77  48.91  45.46  51.56  32.97  10.13 
Prob >F  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Regional and time dummy variables not shown. 
TABLE 9 
Regression for Regional Proportion of Registered Workers: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies 
(Lagged Regressors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
0.003685        0.002525  0.000779 
Regional Effective Tariff 
[0.002967]        [0.003738]  [0.001426] 
  0.002596         
Regional Nominal Tariff 
  [0.003509]         
    0.004658    0.005012  0.006171 
Regional Import Penetration 
    [0.011899]    [0.012131]  [0.005171] 
      0.002155  0.003661  -0.004568 
Regional Export Orientation 
      [0.005033]  [0.007387]  [0.005023] 
          0.900756 
Proportion of workers in Manufacturing 
          [0.123634]** 
          -0.337007 
          [0.079362]**  % workers earning less than mw 
           
Constant  0.621272  0.623155  0.641534  0.641249  0.620169  -0.099816 
  [0.009507]**  [0.009352]**  [0.009311]**  [0.009682]**  [0.010300]**  [0.147417] 
N  59  59  65  65  59  59 
Adj. R2  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  1.00 
F test: industry  331.86  333.74  363.71  357.25  234.34  237.13 
Prob >F  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Robust standard errors in brackets.   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
Industry and time dummy variables not shown.   
Note: As we do not have data on value-added for 1998, specifications that include it have their sample size reduced 
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All in all we find evidence that the increase in the import penetration ratio seems to have 
lowered the wage differential within the manufacturing sector. As for the proportion of 
registered workers in the manufacturing sector, we find some evidence that contemporaneous 
effective tariffs are negatively correlated with the proportion of registered workers. However, 
this result does not hold when we use lagged regressors to assess its robustness. We do not 
find any evidence of spillover effect of trade liberalisation on the economy-wide wage gap.  
But there is some weak evidence that the proportion of registered workers in the entire 
(regional) economy was negatively affected by the increase in import penetration ratio.  
But again this result does not hold when we enter lagged regressors.  
5.3  PSEUDO-COHORT APPROACH 
This last approach aims at putting together the variation exhibited by both tradable and non-
tradable sectors in order to assess the impact of trade liberalisation. Therefore, besides the 
information (variation) due to the heterogeneous impact on the manufacturing sector (traded 
sector) of the trade-related variables, we would be also using the information (variation) on the 
non-traded sector as a comparison group, which was not directly affected by the trade reform 
to identify the overall effect of trade liberalisation on the wage premium for registered workers 
and for its proportion in the pool of employees.  
In the absence of a panel data set that covers most of the country, we decided to build a 
pseudo-panel from the repeated cross section that we have been using so far. In order to get a 
better view of what is going on, the unit of analysis is no longer the industry, but industry-
cohort cells. We divided the sample in 7 cohorts of 10-year length and 30 industry-cells.  
From those 30 industry-cells, 19 are classified as tradable sectors
41 and 11 as non-tradable 
sectors. The latter comprises mainly activities such as construction sector, lodging, restaurants, 
personal services, and productive services.  
The panel is unbalanced due to the fact that persons from the fist cohort (born between 
1916 and 1925) do not show up after 1990 (we drop people older than 65 from the sample) 
and persons from the last cohort (born between 1976 and 1985) only show up in the panel 
from 1990 onwards. Moreover, when some cohorts are still too small (either full of young 
people or older people), they have missing observations for some industries. We use data from 
1981 to 1998,
42 thus for complete industry-cohort cell observations we should observe 16 
observations for each cell. The maximum number of observations in our estimations is 2867.
43 
However, more worrying than the missing cells is whether or not the number of observations 
that have generated the mean value cells for each industry-cohort and for each year is large 
enough, so that we can ignore the correction put forward by Deaton (1985). As Deaton points 
out, if one intends to get an unbiased estimate, then one must take into account the variability 
of the calculated cell mean in the estimation of the parameters. Nevertheless, several studies 
have shown that when the number of observations that have generated the mean cell is 
higher than 100, the correction advocated by Deaton does not make much difference.  
From the 2867 mean cell observations, 56% (1602) were generated from 100 or more 
individual observations. For now, we decide to run the regressions without using the 
correction, but we weight each cell mean observation by the number of observations that 
have generated it.    Fábio Veras Soares  23 
 
In order to investigate the impact of trade liberalization on wage differential and on the 
proportion of registered workers we adopt several different strategies, always using fixed-
effect model with time dummies, where the unit of analysis is the industry-cohort cell.  
First, we will approximate the impact of trade liberalisation by a binary dummy (lib92) that 
assumes value 1 from 1992 onwards and 0 otherwise. We use this definition because the bulk 
of the trade liberalisation process occurred between 1990 and 1992. This strategy will allow us 
to use the whole sample period from 1981 to 1998. The sample period in this case is different 
from the one in the previous section because the trade-related variables that we have used 
there are only available from 1987 onwards. The use of interactions between the binary lib92 
and another binary variable named trade (trade=1 if industry is tradable, and 0 otherwise) will 
allow us to infer whether the wage of workers in the tradable sector had a different behaviour 
when compared to the wages of workers in the non-tradable sector after the trade 
liberalisation. Similar interactions will be used to assess the impact on the wage premium for 
registered workers. In this case, we interact lib92 with the proportion of registered workers in 
the specific industry-cohort cell (preg).  
Second, we will add to the regression the trade-related variables: effective tariff and 
import penetration ratio as we did in the previous sections. In this case, the sample period will 
be reduced to the period 1987-1998; however we will be using additional variation within the 
manufacturing sector in order to estimate the effect of the changes in trade-related measures. 
In order to standardize the trade-related measures so that we can put together the data in 
meaningful way for both tradable and non-tradable sectors, we follow Dickerson et al. (2001) 
and use the following transformations:
44  
Openness=exp(-effective tariff) if the industry is in the tradable sector and Openness=0 
otherwise.;  
Closedness=exp(-import penetration ratio) if the industry is in the tradable sector and 
closedness=1 otherwise.  
These transformations enable us to restrict the openness and closedness measures inside 
the range [0,1]. For the openness measure, the higher the effective tariff the closer the index 
will be to 0; whereas for the closedness measure, the lower the import penetration ratio, the 
closer the index will be to 1.  
Besides the trade-related variables, i.e., lib92 dummy, openness and closedness indices,  
we also control for human capital variables - 6 groups of educations (illiterate as the base 
category), experience and experience squared – gender and registered status. The registered 
status variable will give us a measure of the wage differential between registered and non-
registered workers.
45  
5.4  THE IMPACT ON WAGES 
Table 10 shows the results of the fixed-effect specifications with time dummies. The 
coefficients on column [1] suggest a wage premium of 43%
46 for registered workers. As for the 
impact of trade liberalisation, the coefficient of lib92 and of its interactions with trade show 
that after 1992 tradable sector workers experienced a fall of 13% in their wage relative to their 
counterparts in the non-tradable sector.
47 Column [2] shows that registered workers in the 
tradable sector earn less than registered workers in the non-tradable sector reg*trade. Column 24  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
[3] shows that after 1992 the wage differential in favour of registered workers fell by 17%. 
Columns [4] to [6] bring the results for these same specifications, but excluding the agricultural 
sector.
48 The previous results do not change much. The estimated wage premium for 
registered workers is higher, 95%. After 1992, the wage for workers in the tradable sector fell 
by 11%. Registered workers in the tradable sector earned less than registered workers in the 
non-tradable sector. But the most striking result is the fall in the wage of registered workers by 
55% after 1992. It is clear from these results that after the trade liberalisation, the wage of 
workers in the tradable sector fell relatively to the wage of workers in the non-tradable sector 
and that the wage differential in favour of registered workers fell sharply.  
So far we discussed the different response of the tradable and non-tradable sector wages 
to changes before and after the trade liberalisation in order to identify its impact on wage 
differential between registered and non-registered workers. To add more variability in the way 
that the trade liberalisation may have affected the wage of workers in different industries, we 
introduce the variables openness and closedness and their interactions with the proportion of 
registered workers in order to capture the different intensity that the reform affected different 
tradable industries. Hence, besides variation between tradable and non-tradable sectors, we 
add the variation within the tradable sector to identify the impact of trade liberalisation on the 
wage differential between registered and non-registered workers. Columns [7] to [10] in 
Table 10 show the results for the restricted sample that covers the period 1987-1998 and 
excludes the agricultural sector. This smaller sample period changes a bit the magnitude, but 
not the sign of the previous result: there is a positive wage premium for registered workers, 
but this wage premium is lower in the tradable sector. The openness index added in column [8] 
is negative and statistically significant. When we add the interaction between the openness 
measure and the proportion of registered workers (openness*reg), both variables (openness 
and openness*reg) turn out to be insignificant, but with opposite signs. The coefficient on the 
interaction (openness*reg) is relatively high and negative, whereas the coefficient on openness 
is small and positive. The fall in effective tariffs seems to have affected negatively the wages 
and this effect is mainly borne by registered workers. The closedness index display a positive 
and significant coefficient when entered without interaction as in Column [9]. Thus, increases 
in the import penetration ratio leads to a fall in wages. Column [10] shows that this effect is 
stronger the higher the proportion of registered workers in the sector.  
All in all, it seems that all trade-related measures in the fixed-effect specifications (lib92 
dummy, openness index and closedness index) point to lower wages in the sectors most 
affected by the trade liberalisation, and among the most affected it seems that the registered 
workers were the ones who suffered most. Altogether, these results suggest that, in fact, trade 
liberalisation had a role in narrowing the wage gap between registered and non-registered 
workers. It is noteworthy that the impact of the import penetration ratio in this framework is 
similar to the one we found within the manufacturing sector in our first strategy.   Fábio Veras Soares  25 
 
TABLE 10 
Pseudo-Cohort: Fixed Effects with Time Dummies for log Hourly Wage 
1981 -1998  1987-1998 
Including agricultural sector  Excluding agricultural sector  Excluding agricultural sector 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
0.382  0.578  0.566  0.671  0.715  0.6623  0.9282  0.932  0.8789  0.881 
Reg 
[0.035]**  [0.039]**  [0.041]**  [0.039]**  [0.041]**  [0.0371]**  [0.058]**  [0.058]**  [0.0582]**  [0.058]** 
0.013  0.059  0.164  -0.038  -0.0290  0.2629         
lib92 
[0.057]  [0.056]  [0.059]**  [0.061]  [0.061]  [0.0579]**         
-0.154  -0.126    -0.105  -0.101           
(lib92)*trade 
[0.007]**  [0.008]**    [0.008]**  [0.0080]**           
    -0.198      -0.4440         
(lib92)*reg 
    [0.018]**      [0.0178]**         
  -0.513  -0.868    -0.179  -0.1198  -0.483  -0.470  -0.4573  -0.544 
Reg*trade 
  [0.051]**  [0.049]**    [0.055]**  [0.0502]*  [0.082]**  [0.083]**  [0.0813]**  [0.088]** 
            -0.085  0.069     
Openess 
            [0.036]*  [0.118]     
              -0.284     
Openess*reg 
              [0.209]     
                0.1678  -0.212 
Closedness 
                [0.0307]**  [0.1555] 
                  0.525 
Closedness*reg 
                  [0.211]* 
-1.426  -1.258  -1.093  -1.2912  -1.248  -1.297  -1.4239  -1.433  -1.406  -1.437 
Constant 
[0.096]**  [0.096]**  [0.097]**  [0.095]**  [0.096]**  [0.089]**  [0.160]**  [0.160]**  [0.159]**  [0.159]** 
N  2867  2867  2867  2770  2770  2770  1731  1731  1731  1731 
R2  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
F test: id dummy  25.62  26.12  25.10  30.67  30.13  30.35  21.68  21.70  22.06  22.04 
Standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Id and time dummies not shown. 
5.5  THE IMPACT ON THE PROPORTION OF REGISTERED WORKERS 
The results for the fixed-effect model with time dummies for the proportion of registered 
workers in Table 11 show that the proportion of men and of more educated people is 
positively correlated with the proportion of registered workers regardless of the specification 
in use. Columns [2] to [4] reveal that both tradable and non-tradable sectors had an increase 
in the proportion of registered workers after 1992, and the tradable sector grew by a lower 
amount in the sample without the agricultural sector.
49 However, when the sample is 
restricted to the period 1987 to 1998 and without the agricultural sector, as in Column [5], 
we see no change in the non-tradable sector after 1992 and a decrease in the proportion of 
registered workers in the tradable sector. Columns [6] and [7] show the results including 
openness and closedness indices. The coefficient of the openness index is positive and 
statistically significant (0.0414), implying that the higher the openness index the higher the 
proportion of registered workers. As for the coefficient of the closedness index, it is also 
positive and statistically significant.
50  26  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
 
TABLE 11 
Pseudo-Cohort: Fixed-Effect with Time Dummies for the Proportion of Registered Workers 
1981 – 1998  1987 – 1998 
Including agricultural sector  Excluding agricultural sector  Excluding agricultural sector 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
-0.0575  -0.0599  0.1804  0.1984  -0.2228  -0.2525  -0.2474 
Some elementary 
[0.0505]  [0.0504]  [0.0474]**  [0.0465]**  [0.0601]**  [0.0606]**  [0.0603]** 
0.4767  0.4753  0.5154  0.4946  0.1082  0.0998  0.0950 
Complete elementary 
[0.0405]**  [0.0405]**  [0.0374]**  [0.0367]**  [0.0540]*  [0.0546]  [0.0543] 
0.8354  0.8363  0.8809  0.8795  0.5098  0.4930  0.4970 
Complete primary 
[0.0527]**  [0.0527]**  [0.0482]**  [0.0472]**  [0.0627]**  [0.0633]**  [0.0629]** 
0.7420  0.7447  0.7300  0.7155  0.3722  0.3620  0.3533 
Complete secondary 
[0.0552]**  [0.0552]**  [0.0510]**  [0.0500]**  [0.0690]**  [0.0698]**  [0.0694]** 
0.3991  0.4087  0.4046  0.3811  0.1221  0.1281  0.1088 
Complete College 
[0.0683]**  [0.0683]**  [0.0629]**  [0.0617]**  [0.0846]  [0.0854]  [0.0851] 
0.0023  0.0025  -0.0024  -0.0027  0.0086  0.0090  0.0088 
Experience 
[0.0019]  [0.0019]  [0.0019]  [0.0019]  [0.0029]**  [0.0029]**  [0.0029]** 
-0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004 
Experience^2 
[0.0000]**  [0.0000]**  [0.0000]**  [0.0000]**  [0.0000]**  [0.0000]**  [0.0000]** 
sex  0.1284  0.1205  0.0947  0.1176  0.1767  0.1480  0.1550 
  [0.0263]**  [0.0264]**  [0.0231]**  [0.0228]**  [0.0301]**  [0.0301]**  [0.0299]** 
lib92  0.1646  0.0385  0.2677  0.1300  0.0000     
  [0.0315]**  [0.0088]**  [0.0315]**  [0.0156]**  [0.0000]     
lib92*trade    0.0104    -0.0406  -0.0261     
    [0.0040]**    [0.0040]**  [0.0043]**     
Openness            0.0414   
            [0.0172]*   
Closedness              0.0683 
              [0.0148]** 
Constant  0.1255  0.1289  0.1768  0.1747  0.3395  0.3648  0.3630 
  [0.0533]*  [0.0532]*  [0.0499]**  [0.0489]**  [0.0761]**  [0.0768]**  [0.0764]** 
N  2867  2867  2770  2770  1731  1731  1731 
R2  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.98 
F test: id dummy  52.20  40.64  62.15  34.68  24.92  44.60  41.79 
Standard errors in brackets.   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Id and time dummies not shown. 
Again, there is no strong evidence that trade liberalisation has triggered an increase in the 
proportion of non-registered workers. The fixed effect models with time dummies revealed a 
positive effect of the fall in tariffs on the proportion of registered workers and at the same time 
a negative effect of the increase import penetration ratio. Thus, the fall in tariff would have led 
to an increase in the proportion of registered workers whereas the increase in the import 
penetration ratio would have led to a decrease in the proportion of registered workers.  
6  CONCLUSION 
The fall in the wage differential between registered and non-registered workers as well as the 
fall in the proportion of registered workers are two stylised facts of the Brazilian labour market 
in the 1990’s. In this paper, we investigated whether or not trade liberalisation had a role in this 
process using three strategies: 1) variation in the manufacturing sector; 2) (artificial) regional 
variation and 3) industry-cohort variation.  
Overall, we found evidence that the trade liberalisation process is behind the fall in the 
wage gap in the manufacturing sector. It seems that rents that went to registered workers 
were cut due to the more competitive environment in the economy. This result was found in 
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within-manufacturing industry variation and revealed a negative effect of import penetration 
on the wage gap. The third strategy used the non-tradable sector as a comparison group in 
addition to the variation within the manufacturing sector. In this latter case, both the fall in 
tariffs as measured by the openness index and the increase in import penetration ratio as 
measured by the closedness index led to a fall in the wage gap between formal and informal 
workers. The use of the non-tradable sector as a comparison group in the third strategy can be 
justified by the fact that we failed to find convincing evidence that trade liberalisation had any 
impact on the economy-wide fall in the wage gap according to the second strategy, that used 
regional variation in the industry dispersion to identify the effects of trade liberalisation in the 
entire economy.  
The fall in the proportion of registered workers, however, does not seem to be correlated 
with trade liberalization.
51 None of the strategies yielded robust evidence that the trade 
measures were correlated with the fall in the proportion of registered workers. The evidence 
found in the first strategy that effective tariff led to an increase in the proportion of registered 
workers in the manufacturing sector was not robust to the use of lagged regressors in the 
specification with additional controls. Similarly, the evidence yielded by the second strategy 
that the increase in the import penetration ratio led to a fall in the proportion of registered 
workers in the entire labour market is not robust to the use of lagged regressors. According to 
the third strategy, the fall in tariffs led to a higher proportion of registered workers,
52 whereas 
the increase in the import penetration ratio led to a fall in the proportion of registered workers.  
Therefore, the weak evidence for the effect of trade liberalisation on the proportion of 
registered workers suggests that the fall in the proportion of registered workers was due to 
macroeconomic factors or institutional changes that had affected in a homogenous way 
regions and industries within the country.  
A possible caveat of the approach adopted in this paper is the fact that we do not look at 
the effects of trade liberalisation on the mobility pattern of the working population. Focusing 
on the effect on the proportion of registered workers and on the wage differential gives us 
only a partial account of the possible effects of those changes in the labour market. An 
interesting topic of research would be to analyse what happened to the size of the queue for 
formal jobs after the trade liberalisation. Unfortunately, we do not have surveys that contain a 
question similar to the one used in Soares (2004) to identify informal workers in the queue for 
formal jobs for periods after the trade liberalisation. However, as the wage differential is one of 
the main determinants of the queue for formal jobs, it is reasonable to infer that the size of the 
queue may have diminished after trade liberalisation due to the narrowing of the gap between 
formal and informal workers.  28  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 7 
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NOTES 
 
1. See for example Robbins and Gindling (1999) for Costa Rica, Robbins and Gindling (2001) for Costa Rica and Chile, 
Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico, Beyer et al. (1999) for Chile, Green et al. (2001) and Gonzaga et al. (2002) for Brazil. 
2. See for example Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco, Revenga (1997) for Mexico, Marquez and Pages (1997) 
for a panel of Latin American and Caribbean countries, Menezes-Filho and Arbache (2002) and Arbache and 
Corseuil (2003) for Brazil. 
3. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) is the first paper to the best of our knowledge to focus on this issue. They find that in 
Colombia trade liberalisation seems to have led to an increase in the manufacturing informal sector, but in Brazil there 
was no impact. They attribute such differences to the fact that the Brazilian labour market is more flexible (in terms of 
regulation) than the Colombian. 
4. Maloney (1997) associates some changes in the mobility pattern among Mexican workers, particularly the increase in 
the proportion of “contract” workers with the trade liberalisation in that country. 
5. Besides structural reforms like trade liberalisation, Brazil also witnessed a successful stabilization plan that may have 
impacted employment and wage rates. This is so because the appreciation of the exchange rate was one of the major 
components of the stabilization strategy. For this reason we use industry-specific exchange rates as one of our control 
variables in the regression analysis. Ribeiro et al. (2004) show that a depreciation of the exchange rate affects net 
employment growth by increasing job creation and hires, that tariffs have no effect on job or worker flows, whereas 
import penetration decrease job growth by increasing job destruction. These results suggest that the exchange rate has 
a very important role on job and worker flows, even after controlling for openness measures and sector specificities. 
6. Some commentators of the Brazilian trade liberalisation point out that the reform was launched much more as an 
auxiliary tool in the combat against the hyper-inflationary process witnessed by the Brazilian economy in the early 1990’s. 
See Muendler (2001) and Kume et al. (2000). 
7. The wage differential is calculated as 100[()1] expb *- , where b is the coefficient of a dummy coefficient for 
registered workers in a standard semi-log wage equation, controlling for education (6 categories), experience, experience 
squared, gender, region, and metropolitan area. 
8. Due to this sort of reasoning trade liberalisation has been prescribed as a policy that not only would increase economic 
efficiency, but also would deliver less inequality in developing and unskilled labour abundant countries. 
9. Gonzaga et al. (2002) found exactly the opposite result for Brazil. The reason for this difference, however,  
is not very clear. 
10. In another paper Arbache and Corseuil (2003) find the opposite result using a fixed-effect model with time dummies. 
The result in Green et al. (2001) is based on the spearman correlation of long changes of the two variables. 
11. Notice that unlike Pavcnik et al. (2002) they argue that tariffs fell more in the most skill-intensive sectors, so that their 
analysis could follow the HOS mechanism. 
12. Davis (1996) argues that a possible explanation for this phenomenon is the fact that what is relevant to an economy is 
its relative skilled/unskilled labour supply within its cone of diversification. A country regarded as abundant in unskilled 
labour globally, may be in fact relatively skill abundant inside its relevant cone of diversification. In this case, trade 
liberalisation may have the effect of increasing inequality if the country starts suffering a stronger competition from 
relatively unskilled abundant countries within its cone of diversification. 
13. According to this view, sectors under pressure to increase their productivity due to an increase in foreign competition 
would invest in technology that would lead to a higher demand for skilled labor. Evidence that sectors most affected by 
the trade liberalisation were the ones that experienced an increase in their wage premium or where the wage premium 
of skilled workers increased most would be in line with this argument. 
14. Note that the effect of trade liberalisation on rents or quasi-rents is not consensual. It can decrease rents because it 
increases competition, or it can increase them because it forces an increase in productivity. Thus, the overall effect 
depends on which of these two effects will be dominant. 
15. To the best of our knowledge the only paper to address this issue is Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). 
16. See Barros et al. (1998) for an informal explanation of the argument. 
17. Generally, it is argued that the participation of non-registered workers in the manufacturing sector is so small that it 
can be considered as a specific factor of the non-tradable sector. However, as seen in the last section, despite the higher 
proportion of registered workers in the manufacturing (tradable) sector, its proportion has fallen over time. 
18. See the discussion about the correlation of wage premium and trade-related measures in the next section.  
 
19. Maloney (1997) shows a sharp increase in the number of workers who earn by piece, the so-called contract workers, 
after the trade liberalisation in Mexico. 
20. Most of the available data on firms such as value-added, payroll payment, working hours are data collect from 
medium and large firms. 
21. According to Kume et al. (2000) these partial reforms did not have a strong impact on the foreign competition due to 
their small scope. Despite the apparent strong reduction in nominal tariffs, most of them were redundant. In addition, the 
most important non-tariff barriers were not lifted during this period. 
22. The appreciation of the Real witnessed after the Plano Real together with reductions in tariffs and an increase in 
the aggregate demand led to successive trade deficits. This fact led the government to slightly increase tariffs in 1995. 
It is worth noting that whereas the tariffs were used to control inflation rather than to enhance productivity in the first 
phases of the process, after the Plano Real it was used as a mean to smooth the increasing trade deficits faced by the 
country. However, due to the agreements established by the Mercosur, the ability of the government to change tariffs 
was constrained. 
23. Effective tariff is a measure that not only includes the nominal tariff for the output of the industry, but also takes into 
account input tariffs as a way to measure the overall degree of protection enjoyed by the industry. See Kume et al. (2000) 
for more details. 
24. Import penetration ratio is measured as the ratio between imports over the sum of the value of the production plus 
imports minus exports (M/(Y+M-X)), which gives us a measure of the real external competitive environment faced by 
each industry in the internal market. This variable is important because it is determined not only by tariffs, but also by 
other policy instruments and macroeconomic variables such as non-tariff barriers, exchange rate and GDP growth that 
determine the actual degree of openness of the economy. Data for import penetration ratio and export orientation 
(exports/value of the production) come from Haguenauer et al. (1998). 
25. Unfortunately, due to the lack of the data for 1991 and 1994 for the variables related to wage differential and proportion 
of registered workers we cannot estimate first-difference models in order to test the robustness of the fixed-effect models. 
26. As mentioned in the last section, not only did the government establish different priorities in the tariff reduction 
schedule according to “observable” industry characteristics, such as the more aggressive reduction for intermediate and 
capital goods, but it also tried to curb inflationary pressures through reduction in tariffs due to the ability of certain 
industries to link prices to past inflation and wage hikes. 
27. This classification is not exhaustive of all sectors in the economy, because we excluded the public administration.  
We did that because public administration industry classification was used to filter out public servants that are classified 
as non-registered workers in the household survey.  
28. The use of cohorts enables us to control for industry-cohort fixed-effect, something that we could not do using only 
the repeated cross sections without building the cohorts. 
29. Data for effective and nominal tariffs come from Kume et al. (2000). 
30. Data for import penetration ratio and export orientation come from Haguenauer et al. (1998). 
31. The manufacturing industry groups at 2-digit level are non-metallic, metallurgic, mechanic, electronics, transport, 
wood and furniture, paper printing and publishing, rubber, chemical, oil refining, pharmaceutical and perfume, plastics, 
textiles, clothes, shoes and leather, food, and other industries. 
32. This two-step procedure has been used in the literature on the impact of trade on the US labour market by Borjas and 
Ramey (1994) and Slaughter (2001) see subsection 1 for a discussion of Borjas and Ramey (1994) results. 
33. One alternative to this approach would be to follow Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and regress the probability of being 
a registered worker against other trade measures. This implies a first stage where one would estimate the registered 
status against several controls such as schooling, experience and, most importantly, industry affiliation. In the second 
stage, the estimated coefficient of the industry affiliation would be the dependent variable in a regression equation like 
the one below, and the inverse of its sampling variance would be used as weight in the estimation. We checked the 
robustness of our results and found very similar results when applying this methodology. 
34. The value-added was calculated based as the difference between total sales and total costs of the industries based on 
the data of the Industry Annual Survey (PIA) from IBGE, http://www.ibge.gov.br . 
35. The industry-specific exchange rate was calculated as the weighted average of the nominal exchange rates of 
countries accounting for more than 2% of industry exports in each year as in Revenga (1992). Due to the lack of good 
data on producer price indexes and the high inflation witnessed by the country until 1994, we decided not to 
calculate real exchange rates and to enter the industry-specific nominal exchange rate only in the specifications with 
time dummies.  
 
36.The estimates seem to be small because the explanatory variables entered the regressions as percentages. 
37. The coefficient on effective tariff is not significant at 5% level for the specification with additional controls, column [7]. 
38. In fact, the export orientation ratio is significant in the joint specification. 
39. The results are available upon request. 
40. Notice that the impact of the trade liberalisation on wages as discussed in section 1 applies to the whole economy 
and not only to the manufacturing sector. 
41. Besides the 17 industries used previously, we also add agriculture and the mineral extracting industry to the group of 
tradable sector. As there is no data on import penetration for the agriculture sector, we also run some specifications 
without it. 
42. There is no data for 1991 and 1994 for the annual household was not carried out on those years due to the census and 
shortage of funds, respectively. 
43. This corresponds to the specifications that use data for all years and all sectors (including agriculture). 
44. Behrman et al. (2001) use the maximum of their index of openness (average nominal tariff*standard deviation of 
nominal tariff) as the normalisation factor for their sample of countries. They argue that this would be a more credible 
measure than a [0,1] scale. However, we cannot use such scale since by definition our index measures assume extreme 
values (either 0 or 1) for the non-tradable industries. 
45. Notice that this variable for each industry-cohort cell is not a binary dummy (10) / , but the proportion of registered 
workers on that cell. 
46. Calculated as [100*(exp(0.38)–1)]. 
47. Calculated as 100*[exp(-0.1537+0.0128) –1]. 
48. Note that the sample size was reduced to 2.770 observations. 
49. It is worth noting that unlike the “urban sectors”, the agricultural sector has experienced an increase in the proportion 
of registered workers from 1981 to 1999. 
50. This latter result is in line with the one we found using the Spearman rank correlation. 
51. This result is in line with the results of Goldberg and Pavnick (2003) for Brazil using a different data source, the 
Monthly Employment Survey (PME). 
52. Similar results were found in the first strategy. International Poverty Centre
SBS – Ed. BNDES,10o  andar




Telephone   +55  61  2105 5000
Fax   +55  61  2105 5001